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Abstract
The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of
the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model
deterministic and probabilistic systems. By using a methodology generalizing
the lattice of information approach we model refined attackers capable to observe
the internal behavior of the system, and quantify the information leakage of such
systems. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of
channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we show how to use the
method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on the Onion Routing protocol.
1. Introduction
Quantification of information leakage is a recent technique in security analysis
that evaluates the amount of information about a secret (for instance about a
password) that can be inferred by observing a system. It has sound theoretical
bases in Information Theory [1, 2]. It has also been successfully applied to
practical problems like proving that patches to the Linux kernel effectively
correct the security errors they address [3]. It has been used for analysis of
anonymity protocols [4, 5] and analysis of timing channels [6, 7]. Intuitively,
leakage of confidential information of a program is defined as the difference
between the attacker’s uncertainty about the secret before and after available
observations about the program [1].
The underlying algebraic structure used in leakage quantification for deter-
ministic programs is the lattice of information (LoI) [1]. In the LoI approach
an attacker is modeled in terms of possible observations of the system she can
IAn earlier versions of this paper appeared in the 14th International Conference on Verifi-
cation, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation (2013).
IIThe research presented in this paper has been partially supported by MT-LAB, a VKR
Centre of Excellence for the Modelling of Information Technology.
Email addresses: fabrizio.biondi@inria.fr (Fabrizio Biondi), axel.legay@inria.fr
(Axel Legay), p.malacaria@qmul.ac.uk (Pasquale Malacaria), wasowski@itu.dk (Andrzej
Wąsowski)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier August 25, 2014
make. LoI uses an equivalence relation to model how precisely the attacker
can distinguish the observations of the system. An execution of a program is
modeled as a relation between inputs and observables. In this paper we follow
the LoI approach but take a process view of the system. A process view of the
system is a more concise representation of behavior than an observation relation.
Moreover a process view does not require that the system is deterministic, which
allows us to handle randomized protocols—for the first time using a generic,
systematic and implementable LoI-based methodology.
We use Markov Decision Processes to represent the probabilistic partial-
information semantics of programs, using the nondeterminism of the model for
the choices that depend on the unknown secret. We define the leakage directly
on such model. With our method we can distinguish the inherent randomness of
a randomized algorithm from the unpredictability due to the lack of knowledge
about the secret. We exploit this distinction to quantify leakage only for the
secret, as the information leakage about the random numbers generated is
considered uninteresting (even though it is information in information theoretical
sense). We thus work with both deterministic and randomized programs, unlike
the previous LoI approach.
We give a precise encoding of an attacker by specifying her prior knowledge
and observational capabilities. We need to specify which of the logical states
of the system can be observed by the attacker and which ones he is able to
distinguish from each other. Given a program and an attacker we can calculate
the leakage of the program to the attacker.
We also show how to turn the leakage computation into leakage optimization:
we compute the maximum leakage over all possible prior information of attackers
ceteris paribus, or in other words, the leakage for the worst possible attacker
without specifying the attacker explicitly. This maximum leakage is known as
the channel capacity of the system [8]. Since we are able to model a very large
class of attackers the obtained channel capacity is robust. Computing channel
capacity using this method requires solving difficult optimization problems (as
the objective is nonlinear), but we show how the problem can be reduced to
standard reward optimization techniques for Markovian models for a class of
interesting examples.
Our method can be applied to finite state systems specified using a simple
imperative language with a randomization construct. It can also be used for
systems modeled directly as Markov Decision Processes. We demonstrate the
technique using an MDP model of the known Onion Routing protocol [9], showing
that we can obtain the channel capacity for a given topology from an appropriate
Markov Decision Process describing the probabilistic partial information behavior
of the system. Also, our behavioral view of the system allows us to encode an
attacker with time-tracking capabilities and prove that such an attacker can leak
more information than the canonical attacker that only observes the traffic on
the compromised nodes. Timing-based attacks to the Onion Routing protocol
have been implemented before [10, 11], but to our best knowledge the leakage of
timing-attacks has not been quantified before.
Our contributions include:
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• A method for modeling attack scenarios consisting of process models of
systems and observation models of attackers, including a simple partial-
observability semantics for imperative programs, so that these models can
also be obtained from code.
• A definition of leakage that generalizes the LoI approach to programs with
randomized choices (strictly including the class of deterministic programs),
and dually the first application of the LoI approach to process specifications
of systems.
• A method for computing leakage for scenarios modeled as described above.
The method is fully implementable.
• A method to parametrize the leakage analysis on the attacker’s prior
information about the secret, to allow the computation of channel capacity
by maximizing an objective characterizing leakage as a function of prior
information.
• The worst-case analysis of the Onion Routing protocol when observed by
non time-aware and time-aware attackers able to observe the traffic passing
through some compromised nodes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the core background on
probabilistic systems and the LoI approach. Section 3 gives an overview of our
new leakage quantification method. The non-obvious steps are further detailed
in Sections 4–6. In Sect. 8 we explain how to use the method for computing
channel capacity, and we use this technique to analyze leakage in the onion
routing protocol against untimed and timing attacks (Sect. 9). We discuss the
related work (Sect. 11) and conclude (Sect. 12).
2. Background
We often refer to deterministic, stochastic and nondeterministic behavior. We
use the adjective deterministic for a completely predictable behavior, stochastic
for a behavior that follows a probability distribution over some possible choices,
and nondeterministic for a choice where no probability distribution is given.
We define common concepts in probability theory and information theory
that are used throughout the paper. We refer to basic books on the subject
[12, 13] for the definitions of sample space S, probability of event P (E) and so
on. We use X to denote a discrete stochastic process, i.e. an indexed infinite
sequence of discrete random variables (X0.X1, X2, ...) ranging over the same
sample space S. The index of the random variables in a stochastic process can be
understood as modeling a concept of discrete time, so Xk is the random variable
representing the system at time unit k.
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2.1. Markovian Models
A discrete stochastic process is aMarkov chain C = (C0, C1, C2, ...) iff ∀k ∈ N.
P (Ck|Ck−1, ..., C0) = P (Ck|Ck−1). A Markov chain on a sample space S can
also be defined as follows:
Definition 1. A tuple C = (S, s0, P ) is a Markov Chain (MC), if S is a finite
set of states, s0∈S is the initial state and P is an |S| × |S| probability transition
matrix, so ∀s, t∈S. Ps,t≥0 and ∀s∈S.
∑
t∈S Ps,t = 1.
We write pi(k) for the probability distribution vector over S at time k and
pi
(k)
s the probability pik(s) of visiting the state s at time k. This means that,
considering a Markov chain C as a time-indexed discrete stochastic process
(C0, C1, ...), we write pi(k) for the probability distribution over the random
variable Ck. Since we assume that the chain starts in state s0, then pi(0)s is 1 if
s = s0 and 0 otherwise. Note that pi(k) = pi0P k, where P k is matrix P elevated
to power k, and P 0 is the identity matrix of size |S| × |S|.
A state s ∈ S is absorbing if Ps,s = 1. In the figures we will not draw the
looping transition of the absorbing states, to reduce clutter. We say that a
Markov chain is one-step if all states except the starting state s0 are absorbing.
Let ξ(s, t) denote the expected residence time in a state t in an execution
starting from state s given by ξ(s, t) =
∑∞
n=0 P
n
s,t. We will write ξs for ξ(s0, s).
Given k Markov chains C1 = (S1, s10, P 1),...,Ck = (Sk, sk0 , P k) their syn-
chronous parallel composition is a MC C = (S, s0, P ) where S is S1 × ...× Sk, s0
is s10 × ...× sk0 and Ps1×...×sk,t1×...×tk =
∏k
i=1 Psi,ti .
A real-valued reward function on the transitions of a MC C = (S, s0, P ) is a
function R : S × S → R. Given a reward function on transitions, the expected
reward R(s) for a state s ∈ S can be computed as R(s) = ∑t∈S Ps,tR(s, t), and
the expected total reward R(C) of C as R(C) = ∑s∈S R(s)ξs.
Definition 2. A Markov Decision Process (MDP) is a tuple P = (S, s0, P,Λ)
where S is a finite set of states containing the initial state s0, Λs is the finite set
of available actions in a state s ∈ S and Λ = ⋃s∈S Λs, and P : S×Λ×S → [0, 1]
is a transition probability function such that ∀s, t ∈ S.∀a ∈ Λs. P (s, a, t) ≥ 0
and ∀s ∈ S.∀a ∈ Λs.
∑
t∈S P (s, a, t) = 1.
We we will write s a−→ [P1 7→ t1, ..., Pn 7→ tn] to denote that in state s ∈ S the
system can take an action a ∈ Λs and transition to the states t1, ..., tn with
probabilities P1, ..., Pn.
We will enrich our Markovian models with a finite set V of natural-valued
variables, and we assume that there is a very large finite bit-size M such
that a variable is at most M bit long. We define an assignment function
A : S → [0, 2M − 1]|V| assigning to each state the values of the variables in that
state. We will use the expression v(s) to denote the value of the variable v ∈ V
in the state s ∈ S.
Given a Markov chain C = (S, s0, P ) let a discrimination relation R be an
equivalence relation over S. We use discrimination relation to quotient one-step
Markov chains:
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Definition 3. Given a one-step Markov chain C = (S, s0, P ) and a discrimina-
tion relation R over S, we define the quotient C/R of C over R as the one-step
Markov chain C/R = (S¯, s¯0, P¯ ) where
• S¯ is the set of equivalence classes of S induced by R;
• s¯0 is the equivalence class of s0;
• for each equivalence class s¯ ∈ S′,
P¯s¯0,s¯ =
∑
s∈s¯
Ps0,s
and P¯s¯,s¯ = 1.
2.2. Information Theory
The entropy of a probability distribution is a measure of the unpredictability
of the events considered in the distribution [14].
Definition 4. [13] Let X and Y be two random variables with probability mass
functions p(x) and p(y) respectively and joint probability mass function p(x, y).
Then we define the following non-negative real-valued functions:
• Entropy H(X) = −∑x∈X p(x) log2 p(x)
• Joint entropy H(X,Y ) = −∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log2 p(x, y)
• Conditional entropy H(X|Y ) = −∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log2 p(x|y) =
=
∑
y∈Y p(y)H(X|Y = y) =
∑
y∈Y p(y)
∑
x∈X p(x|y) log2 p(x|y) =
= H(X,Y )−H(Y ) (chain rule)
• Mutual information I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y p(x, y) log2
(
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
)
=
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) ≤ min(H(X), H(Y ))
We will sometimes write H(P(x1),P(x2), ..,P(xn)) for the entropy of the proba-
bility distribution over x1, ..., xn. Mutual information can be generalized to two
vectors of random variables X¯, Y¯ as I(X¯; Y¯ ) =
∑
x¯∈X¯
∑
y¯∈Y¯ p(x¯, y¯) log2
(
p(x¯,y¯)
p(x¯)p(y¯)
)
.
Since every state s in a MC C has a discrete probability distribution over
the successor states we can calculate the entropy of this distribution. We
will call it local entropy, L(s), of s: L(s) = −∑t∈S Ps,t log2 Ps,t. Note that
L(s) ≤ log2(|S|).
As a MC C can be seen as a discrete probability distribution over all of its
possible traces, we can assign a single entropy value H(C) to it. The global
entropy H(C) of C can be computed by considering the local entropy L(s) as
the expected reward of a state s and then computing the expected total reward
of the chain [15]:
H(C) =
∑
s∈S
L(s)ξs
If a Markov chain is one-step its entropy corresponds to the local entropy of the
initial state s0.
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2.3. Information Leakage
Information leakage is a quantitative measure of the security of a system.
Consider a system whose behavior depends on some secret data, like an authen-
tication or anonymity protocol. By observing the behavior of the system an
attacker can infer information about the value of the secret. In information-
theoretical terms, the system itself can be considered a channel transmitting
information between the secret and the attacker, and the amount of information
that passes through this channel corresponds to the amount of information that
the attacker learns about the secret.
Before observing the behavior of the system, the attacker has some prior
information about the secret, for example its size in bits. This is encoded in its
prior distribution h over the values of the secret. The lack of information of the
attacker on the secret before the observation of the system is quantified as the
uncertainty of this prior distribution, or U(h).
Then the attacker observes the output of the system, which we will call O.
From this observation he will learn information about the secret; in particular
his uncertainty about the secret after the observation will be defined as U(h|O).
The difference between the attacker’s uncertainty on the secret before and after
the observation is the information that he learned from the observation, thus
the information leakage is U(h)− U(h|O) = I(O;h).
( 0 1
0 0.3 0.7
1 0.7 0.3
)
Figure 1: Bit XOR
channel matrix
Various measures have been proposed to quantify the infor-
mation leakage of a system. In this work we consider Shannon
leakage, meaning that U(h) just corresponds to the entropy
H(h) of the probability distribution over h, U(h|O) to the pos-
terior entropy H(h|O) and I(O;h) to the mutual information
between O and h. Other measures include min-entropy leakage
[16, 17] when U(h) = maxi(hi) and guessing entropy [7, 18]
when U(h) =
∑
i i· (hi) with p(hi) ≥ p(h2) ≥ ... ≥ p(hn). A
generalization of the leakage measures via gain function called g-leakage has
been proposed by Alvim et al. [19]. Similarly, Boreale and Pampaloni obtained
results on adaptive adversaries under a generalized uncertainty measure [20].
The computational technique proposed in this work computes Shannon leakage,
but it can be adapted to other leakage measures.
( 0 1
0 1 0
1 0.3 0.7
)
Figure 2: Bit AND
channel matrix
As we remarked, these definitions of leakage consider the
system as a channel between the secret and the output ob-
servable by the attacker. It is common to write down this
channel explicitly as a channel matrix, a matrix Ci,j where
the element (i, j) represents the probability that the output
produced will be j if the value of the secret is i. Consider a
simple program that has a 1-bit secret h, generates at random
a bit r with P(r = 0) = 0.3 and outputs the exclusive OR of
h and r. The channel matrix for this program is shown in Fig. 1.
If the program were to calculate the logical AND of h and r instead, the
channel matrix would be the one presented in Fig. 2.
A channel matrix represents an attacker’s knowledge about the system as a
functions from values of the secret to probability distributions over the outputs
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the attacker is able to discern. In this sense it is both accounting for the system’s
behavior and for the attacker’s ability to observe it. It is not accounting for the
attacker’s prior information, and thus is independent from it, meaning that two
attackers with the same discriminating power and different prior information
will be represented by the same channel matrix.
To compute a value for information leakage we also need the attacker’s prior
distribution h over the values of the secret. Once that is fixed, Shannon leakage
can be computed as H(h)−H(h|O) = H(h)−∑o∈O P (o)H(h|O = o).
2.4. Information Leakage Orderings
Consider a program depending on a secret h. We want to construct an
ordering of attackers in which for attackers A and B, A v B means that attacker
A is less effective in discovering information about the secret than attacked B.
Intuitively this means that if A and B begin an attack having the same prior
information about h, then B will discover at least as many bits of information
as A.
Definition 5. Let A and B be two attackers on programs with the same secret
h and sharing the same prior information µ(h). Then we define the leakage
ordering as
A v B iff ∀µ(h).L(A) ≤ L(B)
Since the channel matrix representation encodes the posterior probabilities of
the observables as a function of the possible values of the secret, we can obtain
an ordering just by comparing the channel matrices of A and B. In the following
we will say “attacker A” for “the channel matrix encoding of the program when
observed by attacker A”; properly we are defining orderings on channel matrices,
not on attackers.
Let’s compare the channel matrices in Fig. 1 and 2. The former encodes an
attacker that can observe the result of a logical XOR between the secret bit and
a random bit r with P (r = 0) = 0.3, while the latter encodes an attacker that
can observe the result of a logical AND between the same secret and the same
random bit. Is one of the two channels more informative on the secret than the
other?
In general we would expect different leakage measures to induce different
leakage orderings. In fact, this depends on whether the programs we consider are
fully deterministic or include some randomization mechanism. We present current
results about the ordering for deterministic and non-deterministic programs.
Ordering on deterministic programs: partition refinement. Let Σ be a finite set
of observables over a deterministic program P . Consider all possible equivalence
relations over Σ; each of them represents the discriminating power of an attacker.
Then we define partition refinement ordering between attackers as follows:
Definition 6. Let A and B be two attackers and ∼A, ∼B be their observational
equivalence relations over Σ. We define partition refinement ordering v as
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A v B iff ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ (σ1 ∼B σ2 ⇒ σ1 ∼A σ2) (1)
The ordering forms a complete lattice over the set of all possible equivalence
relations over Σ [21]: the Lattice of Information (abbreviated as LoI).
If A v B then classes in ∼B refine (split) classes in ∼A, thus ∼B is the
observational equivalence relation of an attacker that can distinguish more while
∼A is the observational equivalence relation an attacker that can distinguish less
observables.
Importantly, if A v B then A leaks less information than B under many
different leakage measures, including Shannon leakage, guessing entropy and
min-entropy leakage [1, 22].
By equipping the set Σ with a probability distribution we can see an equiva-
lence relation as a random variable (technically it is the set theoretical kernel of
a random variable but for information theoretical purposes can be considered a
random variable [1]). Hence the LoI can be seen as a lattice of random variables.
The connection between LoI and leakage can be illustrated by this simple
example: consider a password checking program checking whether the user input
is equal to the secret h. Then an attacker observing the outcome of the password
check will know whether the secret is h or not, hence we can model the leakage
of such a program with the equivalence relation {{h}, {x|x 6= h}}.
More generally, observations over a deterministic program P form an equiva-
lence relation over the possible states of P . A particular equivalence class will be
called an observable. Hence an observable is a set of states indistinguishable by
an attacker making that observation. If we consider an attacker able to observe
the outputs of a program then the random variable associated to a program P
is given by the equivalence relation on any two states σ, σ′ from the universe of
program states Σ defined by
σ ' σ′ ⇐⇒ [[P]](σ) = [[P]](σ′) (2)
where [[P]] represents the denotational semantics of P [23]. Hence the equivalence
relation amounts to “having the same observable output”. This equivalence
relation is nothing else than the set-theoretical kernel of the denotational semantic
of P [24].
Ordering on non-deterministic programs: composition refinement. Partition re-
finement is based on the fact that in deterministic programs different observables
induce a partition over the possible values of the secret, i.e. it is not possible for
two different observables to be produced by a single value of the secret. This
property does not hold with non-deterministic programs, so partition refinement
is unfitting as an ordering when non-deterministic programs are involved.
We say that there is a channel factorization between two channels A and B if
there exists a channel C such that A = BC, in the sense of matrix multiplication.
In their work introducing the Lattice of Information [21], Landauer and Redmond
noted that two channels A and B are ordered under partition refinement if and
only if there exists a channel factorization between them. This ordering has
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been studied by Alvim et al. [19] and by McIver et al. [25, 26] with the name
composition refinement ordering vo:
Definition 7. Let A and B be channels. Define composition refinement ordering
vo as
A vo B ⇔ ∃C. A = BC
where C is a channel.
In general, different leakage measures induce different composition refine-
ment orderings. To adapt leakage measures to different problems, Alvim et al.
[19] proposed the g-leakage measure, that generalizes min-entropy leakage via
arbitrary gain functions. In particular it is possible to apply gain functions that
make g-leakage equivalent to Shannon leakage, min-entropy leakage, guessing
entropy, etc. For this reason, results obtained on g-leakage can be generally
applied to multiple leakage measures.
In particular, write A ≤G B if A leaks less information than B under any
gain function. Then the following result holds [19, 26]:
Lemma 1.
A ≤G B ⇔ A vo B
proving the soundness and completeness of the composition refinement ordering
under the g-leakage measure.
In Section 6 we introduce a leakage ordering for probabilistic processes based
on the technique we present in this paper. The ordering is based on Shannon
leakage, and thus induces the same ordering as composition refinement with
Shannon leakage.
3. Information Leakage of Markov Chains
We give an overview of the proposed method for leakage quantification,
deferring the details to later sections. The method proceeds in five steps, that
are all fully automatable for finite state programs. Let a scenario be a pair
(P,A), where P is the system we want to analyze and A is an attacker. We will
call P the program, even if it can be any system suitably modeled as an MDP as
explained in Sect. 4.
Step 1: Define a MDP representing P (Sections 4, 9). We first give a probabilistic
semantics to the program in the form of an MDP, in which probabilistic choices
are represented by successor state distributions and branching is represented by
decision states. This is more or less standard definition of operational semantics
for randomized imperative programs.
Example [24]. A program has two 2-bit long variables l and h. Variable h is
secret, while variable l is public, meaning that the attacker can read l but not
h:
l = 0; while (l != h) do l = l + 1;
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a) b)
Figure 3: Simple loop example a) MDP semantics b) MC model
The MDP representing the probabilistic partial information semantics of the
program is depicted in Fig. 3a. The states in which the system stops and produces
an output are encoded with the absorbing states of the MDP, i.e. the states with
a probability of transitioning to themselves equal to 1. In the MDP in Fig. 3a
states S1, S3, S5 and S6 are absorbing states.
Step 2: Define the attacker A. The MDP we obtained models the behavior of
the process at the required abstraction level, meaning that public variables (l)
are given values and secret variables (h) are given probability distributions. Now
we need to also consider the model of the attacker to transform the MDP in the
Markov chain modeling the process when observed by the attacker.
Definition 8. An attacker is a pair A = (IA,RA) where IA is a probability
distribution over the possible values of the secret, encoding the attacker’s prior
information about it, and RA is a discrimination relation over the states of
the system in which two states are in the same class iff the attacker cannot
discriminate them.
The attacker has some prior information about the secret before observing the
process. This is encoded as the prior IA, that assigns probability distributions
to all high-level variables. In particular, since we assume that the attacker has
access to the source code of the process, he will know the length in bits of the
secret variables, since he can read the variable declarations. For instance if the
secret is declared as a 16-bit integer value the attacker will know that it is an
integer from 0 to 65535. Any additional information the attacker possesses, like
that the secret is not a number from 18 to 556, or that the probability that the
secret is 12 is three times the probability that it is 16, is encoded in the prior
distribution as well.
The discrimination relation RA encodes what states of the MDP the attacker
can discriminate. The usual case is that some of the low-level variables are
observable by the attacker, and thus the attacker can discriminate two states iff
they differ in the value of at least one of the observable variables. States with the
same values for all the observable variables are indistinguishable to the attacker.
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c) d) e)
Figure 4: Simple loop example c) Observable reduction d) Relabeling e) Quotient
Example. In our example we will use the following attacker: IA = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)
(no prior information) and RA = {(S1, S5), (S3, S6)} (cannot distinguish states
S1 from S5 and S3 from S6).
Step 3: Resolve the nondeterminism in the MDP. To transform the MDP in a
MC, in order to compute leakage, we need to exploit the prior information IA
of the attacker. We use it to compute a probability distribution over possible
values of private variables in each states of the MDP. To do this for a given state
s we just need to normalize IA on the allowed values of the private variables
for the state. The probability of the each action a ∈ Λs is computed as the
probability of the event labeling a given the probability distribution over the
values of the secret in s. We will denote the obtained MC by C.
Example. In state S0 the probability distribution over h is IA = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)
and l=0. The program transitions to state S1 if h=l and to state S2 if h 6=l. We
have that PS0,S1 is P(h = l|S0) = 1/4 and the probability distribution on h in
S1 is (1, 0, 0, 0). Complementarily, PS0,S2 is 3/4 and the probability distribution
on h in S2 is (0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Figure 3b shows the Markov chain C obtained by
repeating this step in all states of the MDP of Fig. 3a.
Step 4: Hide internal states (Sect. 5). We want to model the fact that most of
the states of the system are not observable to the attacker. We assume that the
attacker can start the process and then only observe the value of the output after
the process terminates, so all states except the initial state and the absorbing
states must be hidden. Let T be the set of all states of the Markov chain except
the initial state and the absorbing states.
The procedure is implemented in Algorithm 1 in Section 5. We call C the
observable reduction of the scenario. Importantly, C is a one-step Markov chain.
Example. Figure 4c presents the observable reduction for the running example.
Step 5: Compute the Quotients. Having modeled the problem scenario as a
one-step Markov chain, we now want to compute the information leakage of
the scenario. To compute it we apply the formula for mutual information
I(O, h) = H(O) +H(h)−H(O, h) introduced in Section 2, where (O, h) is the
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joint distribution of the secret and observable variables and (O) and (h) are the
marginal distributions. At this step all three will be modeled as one-step Markov
chains, respectively CO,h, CO and Ch. We need to produce the three Markov
chains and compute their entropy.
The three Markov chains are obtained from the observable reduction by
quotienting it by appropriate discrimination relations, as explained in Definition
3. The discrimination relation to obtain CO is RA, as it represents the attacker’s
discrimination on the secret. We will call CO = C/RA the attacker’s quotient.
Since C is a one-step Markov chain, the only transitions are the ones from
the starting states to the absorbing states and the looping transitions with
probability 1 of the absorbing states, so the quotient collapses together absorbing
states in the same equivalence class. The transition probability from the starting
state to a class is the sum of the transition probabilities from the starting state
to the states composing the class.
The secret’s quotient Ch represents the marginal distribution of the secret
variable. Its entropy is also a measure of how many bits of the secret variable
are actually used by the process. Let Rh be a discrimination relation such that
two states are in the same class if and only if they assign the same set of possible
values to the secret variables. Then Ch = C/Rh.
Finally we compute the joint quotient CO,h representing the joint behavior
of the secret and observable variables. It is obtained by quotienting the scenario
Markov chain model by RA∩Rh, thus lumping in the same class only states that
agree both on the values of the observable variables and on the set of possible
values for the secret variables: CO,h = C/(RA ∩Rh).
Example. Recall that in the running example the attacker is only able to
read the parity of l. We have that RA = {(S1, S5), (S3, S6)}. We name the
equivalence classes even and odd and relabel the state with the classes (see
Fig. 4d). The attacker’s quotient for the running example is shown in Fig. 4e.
Since this example is deterministic it is not necessary to compute the secret’s
quotient and the joint quotient, as explained in the next paragraph.
Step 6: Compute the Leakage. Finally, we compute the information leakage by
computing H(CO), H(Ch) and H(CO,h) and applying the formula
I(O, h) = H(CO) +H(Ch)−H(CO,h)
This requires us to be able to compute the entropy of Markov chains. Since
in this procedure the chains are reduced by the hiding algorithm to a single step
it reduces to computing the local entropy of the initial state of each chain.
Note that if a process is deterministic, i.e. never uses the random assignment
function, then all uncertainty in the system follows from lack of information
about the secret, so H(Ch) = H(CO,h) and consequently I(O, h) = H(CO). In
this case we can simply compute the attacker’s quotient and its entropy, as it
corresponds with the information leakage. This will be explained in more details
in Section 6.
Example. The program is deterministic, the leakage of the scenario (P,A) is
equivalent to the entropy of the attacker’s quotient in Fig. 4e, or 1 bit.
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...
42 x := x +3;
43 if (x<8) then x := x + 1;
...
Figure 5: Markov chain semantics for a snippet of imperative code
4. Handling Randomized Imperative Programs
A Markov chain is a probabilistic process respecting the Markov property,
meaning that the distribution over the states at a certain time depends only
on the distribution at the time immediately before. This means that in each
state of the Markov chain there must be enough information to determine the
probability distribution on the next step. The state of the Markov chain captures
the program state, so valuations of all variables and the program counter.
4.1. A Simple Example
Let line 42 in the source code be x := x + 3;, and let state s be the
assignment {pc 7→ 42, x 7→ 3}, where pc is the value of the program counter.
Then in the model there will be a transition with probability 1 to a state t
where {pc 7→ 43, x 7→ 6}: the program counter is increased by 1 as a default
behavior, and the variable x is increased by 3 according to the instruction we
are processing.
Since imperative programming languages are deterministic, for each state
there will be exactly one other state that will follow with probability 1. This
would lead to a trivial and uninteresting Markov chain. The reason why we
are using probabilistic processes as models is their capability of representing
imperfect information about the behavior of a system. We use this to represent
what an attacker with imperfect information about the process knows about
the process’ behavior. In practice we lift the states to represent not just an
assignment of values to the variables, but a level of information of an attacker
about these assignments.
Imagine that we allow states to represent assignment of sets of values to
each variable except the program counter. Then for the example above we may
have a state s′ = {pc 7→ 42, x 7→ {3, 4, 7}} representing the fact that the variable
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x could have value either 3, 4 or 7. From s′ we would have a transition with
probability 1 to state t′ = {pc 7→ 43, x 7→ {6, 7, 10}}, representing the fact that
variable x has been increased by 3 and is now either 6, 7 or 10.
Now imagine that line 43 of the source code is if (x<8) then x := x +
1;. Then from state t′ we could only have a transition with probability 1 to
state u′ = {pc 7→ 44, x 7→ {7, 8, 10}}. But we could actually define two more
precise successor states for t′: u′′ = {pc 7→ 44, x 7→ {7, 8}} is visited if the guard
is evaluated to be true and u′′ = {pc 7→ 44, x 7→ {10}} is visited if the guard is
evaluated to false.
The probability of transitioning from t′ to u′′ and u′′′ is the probability that
the guard is true or false in t′, respectively. This means that if we have in each
state a probability distribution over possible values of each variable we can have
two possible successor states each time a conditional statement is evaluated,
and in the state we have enough information to compute the probability that
the guard will be true or false. If in t′ we have that variable x has a uniform
distribution over the three values 6, 7 and 10 then we can compute that the
guard x<8 will be true with probability 2/3 and false with probability 1/3, thus the
probability of transitioning from t′ to u′′ is 2/3 and the probability of transitioning
from t′ to u′′′ is 1/3. The snippet of code and resulting Markov chain are depicted
in Fig. 5.
Note that, since we assume a distribution on the variable x in every state of
the Markov chain, we could have split t′ or even s′ in three different states, one
for each possible assignment of values to x, and given each of them a starting
probability depending on the initial distribution over x. This would have meant
encoding a different level of information about the attacker, and would also have
multiplied the number of states of the chain. The level of abstraction we apply
in this work represents the fact that the attacker knows the bit size of the secret
variables but not their exact value.
4.2. Semantics
We give a simple probabilistic partial-observation semantics for an imperative
language with randomization. This semantics, akin to abstract interpretation,
derives Markovian models of finite state programs automatically.
We distinguish a list of variables (pc, L,H) where pc is the program counter,
L is the set of public variables and H is the set of private variables. The secret
is one of the private variables. In each state a given value is assigned to each
variable in L and to the program counter, while a probability distribution over a
set of possible values is assigned to each variable in H. Assume that all variables
are integer of fixed size. While variables can be declared at any point of the code,
we assume that no two variables are declared with the same name, so a global
variable scope is sufficient. High-level variables are read-only and cannot be
accessed externally; their value estimation changes only through observation via
evaluation of branch conditions. This models the fact that the attacker cannot
directly print or modify a secret value, but only learn about it by observing the
decisions that the process takes that depend on it.
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pc: public intn v := k
(pc, L,H) >−→ [1 7→ (pc + 1, L ∪ {(k/v, n)}, H)]
pc: private intn h
(pc, L,H) >−→ [1 7→ (pc + 1, L,H ∪ {({0,...,2n-1}/h, n)})]
pc: skip
(pc, L,H) >−→ [1 7→ (pc + 1, L,H)]
pc: v := f(l)
(pc, L,H) >−→ [1 7→ (pc + 1, L[f(l)/v], H)]
pc: v := rand p
(pc, L,H) >−→ [p 7→ (pc + 1, L[0/v], H), (1− p) 7→ (pc + 1, L[1/v], H)]
pc: goto label
(pc, L,H) >−→ [1 7→ (label, L,H)]
pc: return
(pc, L,H) >−→ [1 7→ (pc, L,H)]
pc: if g(l,h) then la: A else lb: B
(pc, L,H) g(l,h)−−−−→ [1 7→ (la, L,H|g(l,h))]
pc: if g(l,h) then la: A else lb: B
(pc, L,H) ¬g(l,h)−−−−−→ [1 7→ (lb, L,H|¬g(l,h))]
Figure 6: Execution rules in probabilistic partial information semantics generating a MDP.
Let l, v (resp.h) range over names of public (resp. private) variables and p
range over reals from [0; 1]. Let label denote program points and f (g) pure
arithmetic (Boolean) expressions. Assume a standard set of expressions and the
following statements:
stmt ::= public intn v | private intn h | v := f(l...) | v := rand p |
skip | goto label | return | if g(l...,h...) then stmt-list
else stmt-list
The first statement declares a public variable v of size n bits with a given
value k, while the second statement similarly declares a private variable h of
size n bits with allowed values ranging from 0 to 2n − 1. Remember that we
assume that there exists and arbitrarily large integer M such that variables
larger than M cannot be declared, so in both declarations n ≤M . The third
statement assigns to a public variable the value of expression f depending on
other public variables. The fourth statement assigns zero with probability p,
and one with probability 1−p, to a public variable. The return statement
outputs values of all public variables and terminates. A conditional branch first
evaluates an expression g dependent on private and public variables; the first list
of statements is executed if the condition holds, and the second otherwise. For
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simplicity, all statement lists must end with an explicit jump, as in: if g(l,h)
then ...; goto done; else ...; goto done; done: ... . Each program can be
easily transformed to this form. Since only a single variable scope exists, loops
can be added in a standard way as a syntactic sugar.
The semantics (Fig. 6) is a small-step operational semantics with transitions
from states to distributions over states, labeled by expressions dependent on
h (only used for the conditional statement). It generates an MDP over the
reachable state space. In Fig. 6, v, l are public variables and h is a private
variable. Expressions in rule consequences stand for values obtain in a standard
way. L[X/l] denotes substitution ofX as the new value for l in mapping L. Finally,
H|g denotes a restriction of each set of possible values in a mapping H, to contain
only values that are consistent with Boolean expression g. Observe that the
return rule produces an absorbing state—this is how we model termination
in an MDP. The rand rules produces a proper distribution, unlike the Dirac
distributions. The if rule produces a nondeterministic decision state.
In the obtained MDP states are labeled by values of public variables and
sets of values of private variables. Actions from each state represent the secret-
dependent events for the state. Also, the set of allowed values for each secret
variable in the successor of a given state is be a subset of the allowed values
for the same variable in the state itself. Our leakage quantification technique
works for any MDP with these properties, even the ones not necessarily obtained
from code. In Sect. 9 we will create such a model directly from a topology of the
Onion Routing protocol.
5. Hiding Internal States
In the simple loop example of Sect. 3 the attacker is unable to observe states
S2 and S4; we call these non-observable states hidden. His view of the system is
thus adequately represented by the MC in Fig. 4c. In this figure the probability
of going from the state S0 to state S5 is the probability of reaching S5 from
S0 in the MC of Fig. 3b eventually, after visiting zero or more unobservable
intermediate states. These states can be eliminated (hidden) for the purpose of
leakage computation.
Hiding the internal states models the fact that the attacker can observe
the values of the observable variables after the termination of the system. If
the system does not terminate, the attacker knows that the system did not
terminate but can read no value of the observable variables. This modeling
choice is consistent with the assumptions behind the channel matrix model.
Note that the initial state cannot be hidden, as we assume the attacker knows
that the system is running. This assumption does not restrict the power of the
approach, since one can always model a system, whose running state is unknown,
by prefixing its initial state by a pre-start state, making it initial, and hiding
the original initial state.
The distinction between the indistinguishable states encoded in RA and
the hidden states encoded in T is fine but fundamental. While the attacker
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Data: A Markov chain C = (S, s0, P ), the set T ⊆ S of states to hide.
Result: The Markov chain C = (S ∪ {↑} \ T , s0, P )
Add to S the divergence state ↑ with P↑,↑ = 1 and pi(0)↑ = 0;
while T 6= ∅ do
Choose a state t ∈ T ;
if Pt,t = 1 then
pi
(0)
↑ ← pi(0)↑ + pi(0)t
foreach s ∈ S do
Ps,↑ ← Ps,↑ + Ps,t
Ps,t ← 0
end
else
foreach u ∈ S do
Pt,u ← Pt,u1−Pt,t
pi
(0)
u ← pi(0)u + pi(0)t Pt,u
foreach s ∈ S do
Ps,u ← Ps,u + Ps,tPt,u
Ps,t ← 0
end
end
end
S ← S \ {t}
T ← T \ {t}
end
Algorithm 1: Hide a subset of the states of a Markov chain.
can observe whether the system is in one of the equivalence classes of the
discrimination relation RA, he is not even aware of the existence of the hidden
states in the set T . For instance this means that he can count how many time
steps the chain spends in an equivalence class of RA but not how many steps the
chain spends in the hidden states. To encode the attacker that only observes the
output of the process after its termination, we hide all states except the starting
state and the absorbing states of the chain: the attacker knows when the process
starts and ends but cannot perform observations about what happens during
the computation.
The fact that the hidden states in T cannot be observed raises a question:
what happens if the process terminates in one of these states? In this case the
attacker would not be able to observe the termination of the program. Similarly,
what if the process does not terminate at all, and its behavior loops forever
within these hidden states? It can be seen that the two cases are equivalent from
the point of view of the attacker: he observes that the program gets to a certain
point and that nothing else happens, including termination. To address this
problem we consider termination as one of the possible observable outputs of
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the program and introduce a nontermination absorbing state modeling this case.
Algorithm 1 details the procedure. We will overload the set difference symbol
\ to use for the hiding operation: we write C = C \ T for the observable MC
obtained from C by hiding the states in set T . If a system stays in a hidden
state forever, we say it diverges. Divergence will be symbolized by a dedicated
absorbing state named ↑.
The hidden states are removed from the chain one by one, and each time the
transition probability of the other states are modified to consider the probability
of eventually transitioning from one state to the other through the hidden state.
The initial probability pi(0) is similarly updated.
6. Computing Quotients and Leakage
At this point we have the observable reduction C obtained through the hiding
protocol. Remember that C is a one-step Markov chain.
We want to compute the three quotients introduced in Step 5 of Section 3:
• The attacker’s quotient CO = C/RA, representing the distribution over
the observables;
• The secret’s quotient Ch = C/Rh with Rh = {(s, t) ∈ S × S |h(s) = h(t)}
representing the distribution over the values of the secret variable h;
• The joint quotient CO,h = C/(RA∩Rh) representing the joint distribution
over values of the secret and observables.
The next definition applies the mutual information formula of Definition 4
to compute the Shannon leakage of a scenario:
Definition 9. Let (P,A) be a scenario, A = (IA,RA) an attacker, and Co,
Ch and CO,h the attacker’s, secret’s and joint quotient, respectively. Then the
information leakage of P to A is
Leakage(P,A) = I(CO;Ch) = H(CO) +H(Ch)−H(CO,h).
Corollary 1. If P is a deterministic program, then the leakage is H(CO).
The common definition of leakage of the LoI approach [2] assumes that
the attacker can observe the different output of a deterministic system. It can
be easily encoded in our method. Consider a deterministic program P with a
low-level variable o encoding the output of the program, H(LoI(P)) as defined
in [2], and Leakage(P,A) as defined in Definition 9. Let the an attacker AI/O
have RAI/O = {(s, t) ∈ S × S | o(s) = o(t)}. The following proposition states
that the attacker AI/O is the one considered in [2]:
Theorem 1. Let (P,AI/O) be a scenario, with P deterministic and AI/O being
the attacker defined above. Then
H(CO) = H(LoI(P))
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The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following Corollary:
Corollary 2. Let P be a program and oi its outputs. For each oi, the total
probability of reaching absorbing states labeled with oi in the MDP semantics of
P is equal to P([[P]] = oi) where [[P]] is the r.v. derived from the denotational
semantics of the program (i.e. LoI(P)).
Proof.
Now we can proceed to the proof of Theorem 1:
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that since all internal states are hidden, the MC is
a 1-step probability distribution from the starting state to the output states.
By Corollary 2 the probability of observing the observations oi is consistent
with the probability of observing the same observations in P, thus H(CO) =
H(C/RAI/O ) = H([[P]]) = H(LoI(P)).
7. Leakage Ordering for Probabilistic Programs
Discrimination relations are equivalence relations in which an equivalence class
represents a set of states that cannot be distinguished by the attacker. Different
attackers have different discriminating power. We call RA the discrimination
relation of an attacker. A discrimination relation is encoded in the program by
quotienting the observable reduction C by RA
This procedure generalizes the discrimination relation ordering used in the
LoI approach [1] and allows us to define a leakage ordering that is also valid
for probabilistic programs. Let A1 = (IA,RA1) and A2 = (IA,RA2) be two
attackers sharing the same prior information, and define
A1 v A2 iff RA1 ⊇ RA2
Theorem 2. Let A1 and A2 be two attackers such that A1 v A2. Then for
any program P, the leakage of the scenario (P,A1) is greater or equal then the
leakage of the scenario (P,A2).
Proof. The theorem can be considered a consequence of a known result by
Nakamura [27, Section 4.3] Let X be the random variable on the space X
representing the value of the secret. For j ∈ {1, 2} let Oj be the random variable
on the space Oj representing the observable value observed by the attacker
Aj . Then the leakage of the scenario (P,Aj) is I(X;Oj) = H(X)−H(X|Oj).
Since A1 v A2, then the outcomes in O1 partition the outcomes in O2 such
that for each outcome o1 ∈ O1 there exists a nonempty set of outcomes Qo1 =
{o21, ..., o2k} ⊆ O2 satisfying P (o1) = P (o21) + ... + P (o2k) = P (Qo1). The
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claim of the theorem can be rewritten as
H(X)−H(X|O1) ≤ H(X)−H(X|O2)
≡ H(X|O1) ≥ H(X|O2)
≡ −
∑
o1∈O1
P (o1)H(X|O1 = o1) ≥ −
∑
o2∈O2
P (o2)H(X|O2 = o2)
≡
∑
o1∈O1
P (o1)
∑
x∈X
P (x|o1) logP (x|o1) ≤
∑
o2∈O2
P (o2)
∑
x∈X
P (x|o2) logP (x|o2)
≡
∑
o1∈O1
∑
x∈X
P (x, o1) log
P (x, o1)
P (o1)
≤
∑
o2∈O2
∑
x∈X
P (x, o2) log
P (x, o2)
P (o2)
≡
∑
o1∈O1
∑
x∈X
P (x, o1) log
P (x, o1)
P (o1)
≤
∑
o1∈O1
∑
o2∈Qo1
∑
x∈X
P (x, o2) log
P (x, o2)
P (o2)
⇐ ∀x∈X .∀o1∈O1 .
P (x, o1) log P (x, o1)
P (o1)
≤
∑
o2∈Qo1
P (x, o2) log
P (x, o2)
P (o2)

(since the Q sets partition O2)
≡ ∀x∈X .∀o1∈O1 .
P (x,Qo1) log P (x,Qo1)P (Qo1) ≤
∑
o2∈Qo1
P (x, o2) log
P (x, o2)
P (o2)

(since P (o1) = P (Qo1))
≡ ∀x∈X .∀o1∈O1 .
 ∑
o2∈Qo1
P (x, o2) log
P (x,Qo1)
P (Qo1)
≤
∑
o2∈Qo1
P (x, o2) log
P (x, o2)
P (o2)

(since P (x,Qo1) = P (x ∧ (o21 ∨ ... ∨ o2k)))
which holds by the log sum inequality.
Effectively, the attacker that is able to discriminate more states (a language-
like qualitative property) is able to get more information by observing the
system (an information- theoretical quantitative property). The attacker who
can get most information is the one who can discriminate all states, thus its
discrimination relation is the identity. The attacker getting the least information
is the one who cannot discriminate any state from any other: to this attacker
the system leaks no information.
8. Computing Channel Capacity
The method we presented computes the leakage for a scenario, but it is
common in security to ask what is the leakage of a given program in the worst-
case scenario, i.e. for the scenario with the highest leakage. We consider the
maximum leakage over all the attackers with the same discrimination relation
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RA but different prior information IA. We define a class of attackers this way
because maximizing over all discrimination relations would just conclude that
the attacker able to discriminate all states leaks all the information in the system.
The maximum leakage for a class of attackers is known as channel capacity, and
it is the upper bound to the leakage of the system to any attacker [8]:
Definition 10. Let P be a program and A the class of all attackers with
discrimination relation RA. Let Aˆ ∈ A be the attacker maximizing the leakage
of the scenario (P,A) for all A ∈ A. Then the channel capacity of P is the
leakage of the scenario (P, Aˆ).
a)
b)
Figure 7: Reduction from MDP
to parameterized MC
To compute it we proceed as follows.
We first transform the MDP semantics of
P in a parametrized MC with constraints.
Then we define a MC and a reward func-
tion from it such that the expected total re-
ward of the MC is equivalent to the leak-
age of the system. Then we extract an
equation with constraints characterizing this
reward as a function of the prior infor-
mation IA of the attacker. Finally, we
maximize the equation and obtain the max-
imum leakage, i.e. the channel capac-
ity. In the next Section we will apply
this method to compute the channel capac-
ity of attacks to the Onion Routing proto-
col.
Step 1: Find the parametrized MC. We abuse the notation of Markov chain
allowing the use of variables in the transition probabilities. This allows us to
transform the MDP semantics of a program P in a MC with the transition
probabilities parametrized by the probability of choosing the actions in each
state.
Consider the MDP in Fig 7a; in state S0 either h = 0 or h 6= 0 and the system
moves to the next state with the appropriate transition probability. Let P(0)
and P(¬0) be P(h = 0|S0) and P(h 6= 0|S0) respectively; then we can transform
the MDP in the MC in Fig 7b, with the constraint P(0) +P(¬0) = 1.
We hide the internal states in the MC obtaining the one-step observational
reduction C, as described in Sect. 5.
Step 2: Define a reward function for leakage. We want to define a reward
function on the parametrized MC such that the expected total reward of the
chain is equivalent to the leakage of the system. This step can be skipped if the
leakage equation can be obtained directly from the model, like in the examples
in the next Section. In the example in Fig. 7 the system is deterministic, so its
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leakage is equal to its entropy by Corollary 1, and we just need to define the
entropy reward function on transitions R(s, t) = − log2 Ps,t, as explained in [15].
For a probabilistic system we need to build another MC by composing the
three quotients CO, Ch and CO,h, and we define the leakage reward function on
the composed chain:
Theorem 3. Let C be the parallel composition of CO, Ch and CO,h. Let R be
a reward function on the transitions of C such that
R(s1 × s2 × s3, t1 × t2 × t3) = log2
Ps1,t1Ps2,t2
Ps3,t3
.
Then the expected total infinite time reward of C with the reward function R is
equivalent to H(CO) +H(Ch)−H(CO,h) and thus to the leakage.
The proof of Theorem 3 follows immediately from the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. Let C1 = (S1, s10, P1), C2 = (S2, s20, P2) be Markov chains. Let
C(S, s0, P ) be their synchronous parallel composition, i.e. S = S1 × S2, s0 =
s10 × s20 and
Ps1×s2,t1×t2 = Ps1,t1Ps2,t2 .
Let R+ and R− be reward functions on the transitions of C such that
R+(s1 × s2, t1 × t2) = log2 (Ps1,t1Ps2,t2) .
R−(s1 × s2, t1 × t2) = log2
(
Ps1,t1
Ps2,t2
)
.
Then the expected total infinite time reward of C with the reward function R+
is equivalent to H(C1) +H(C2) and the expected total infinite time reward of C
with the reward function R− is equivalent to H(C1)−H(C2).
Proof. We will prove the result forR−; the proof forR+ is symmetrical. Consider
a state s = s1 × s2 of C. The expected reward of s is
R−(s) =
∑
t∈S
Ps,tR
−(s, t)
=
∑
t1∈S1
∑
t2∈S2
Ps1,t1Ps2,t2 log2
Ps1,t1
Ps2,t2
=
∑
t1∈S1
∑
t2∈S2
Ps1,t1Ps2,t2(log2 Ps1,t1 − log2Ps2,t2)
=
∑
t1∈S1
∑
t2∈S2
Ps1,t1Ps2,t2 log2 Ps1,t1 −
∑
t1∈S1
∑
t2∈S2
Ps1,t1Ps2,t2 log2 Ps2,t2
=
∑
t2∈S2
Ps2,t2
∑
t1∈S1
Ps1,t1 log2 Ps1,t1 −
∑
t1∈S1
Ps1,t1
∑
t2∈S2
Ps2,t2 log2 Ps2,t2
= 1 ·
∑
t1∈S1
Ps1,t1 log2 Ps1,t1 − 1 ·
∑
t2∈S2
Ps2,t2 log2 Ps2,t2
= L(s1)− L(s2)
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thus the expected total reward of C is
R−(C ) =
∑
s∈S
R−(s)ξs
=
∑
s∈S
R−(s)
∞∑
n=0
Pns0,s
=
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
(L(s1)− L(s2))
∞∑
n=0
Pns10,s1
Pns20,s2
=
∑
s1∈S1
L(s1)
( ∞∑
n=0
Pns10,s1
∑
s2∈S2
Pns20,s2
)
−
∑
s2∈S2
L(s2)
( ∞∑
n=0
(Pns20,s2
∑
s1∈S1
Pns10,s1
)
=
∑
s1∈S1
L(s1)
∞∑
n=0
(
Pns10,s1
· 1
)
−
∑
s2∈S2
L(s2)
∞∑
n=0
(
Pns20,s2
· 1
)
=
∑
s1∈S1
L(s1)ξs1 −
∑
s2∈S2
L(s2)ξs2
= H(C1)−H(C2).
Step 3: Extract the leakage as an equation. Now that we have a reward function
R on the transitions of a MC characterizing the leakage of the system, we need
to maximize it. One possible strategy is to extract the explicit equation of the
reward of the chain as a function of the transition probabilities, which themselves
are a function of the prior information IA. For a reward function R(s, t) on
transitions the reward for the MC is
R(C) =
∑
s∈S
R(s)ξs =
∑
s∈S
(∑
t∈S
Ps,tR(s, t) ·
∞∑
k=0
Ps0,s
)
Since for the leakage reward function R(s, t) is a function of Ps,t, the transition
probabilities are the only variables in the equation.
In the example in Fig. 7 the leakage is equal to the entropy, so the reward
function is R(s, t) = − log2 Ps,t and the leakage equation is
R(C) = − (P(0)/4 + P(¬0)/2) log ((P(0)/4 + P(¬0)/2))−
− (3P(0)/4 + P(¬0)/2) log ((3P(0)/4 + P(¬0)/2)) (3)
under the constraint above.
Step 4: Maximize the leakage equation. Maximizing the extracted constrained
leakage equation computes the channel capacity of the system. This can be done
with any maximization method. Note that in general the strategy maximizing
this reward function will be probabilistic, and thus will have to be approximated
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numerically. In the cases in which the maximum leakage strategy is deterministic,
an analytical solution can be defined via Bellman equations. This case is more
complex that standard reward maximization for MDPs, since the strategy in
every state must depend on the same prior information IA, and this is a global
constraint that cannot be defined in a MDP. A theoretical framework to automate
this operation is being studied, but most cases are simple enough to not need it,
like the examples in the next Section.
9. Onion Routing
9.1. Case: Channel Capacity of Onion Routing
Onion Routing [9] is an anonymity protocol designed to protect the identity
of the sender of a message in a public network. Each node of the network is a
router and is connected to some of the others, in a directed network connection
topology; the topology we consider is the depicted in Fig. 8. When one of the
nodes in the topology wants to send a message to the receiver node R, it initializes
a path through the network to route the message instead of sending it directly
to the destination. The node chooses randomly one of the possible paths from
itself to R, respecting the following conditions:
1. No node can appear in the path twice.
2. The sender node cannot send the message directly to the receiver.
3. All paths have the same probability of being chosen.
If some nodes are under the control of an attacker, he may try to gain information
about the identity of the sender. In this example node 3 is a compromised node;
the attacker can observe the packets transitioning through it, meaning that when
a message passes through node 3 the attacker learns the previous and next node
in the path. The goal of the attacker is to learn the identity of the sender of the
message; since there are 4 possible senders, this is a 2-bit secret. For simplicity,
we assume that the attacker knows that a packet is passing through the onion
routing system. This is consistent with similar analyses of the Onion Routing
protocol [5].
Figure 8: Network topology for Onion
Routing
h Path o P(O|h)
1(h1) 1→ 2→ R NN 1/2
1→ 2→ 3→ R 2R 1/2
2(h2) 2→ 3→ R 2R 1
3(h3) 3→ 2→ R N2 1
4(h4) 4→ 3→ R 4R 1/2
4→ 3→ 2→ R 42 1/2
Figure 9: Onion Routing paths, obser-
vations and probabilities
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Figure 10: Markov Decision Process for Onion Routing
Figure 9 summarizes the possible secrets of the protocol, the corresponding
paths, the observation for each path assuming node 3 is compromised and the
probability that a given sender will choose the path.
We give directly the MDP semantics of the system in Fig. 10. The prior
information IA of the attacker consists of the prior probabilities he assigns to
the identity of the sender; we use hi to denote P(h =i), for i = 1...4. Clearly
h1 +h2 +h3 +h4 = 1. The full system is represented in Fig. 10, parametrized on
the hi parameters. Each state is labeled with the low-level variables l and o and
the confidential variable h. Variable l represents the name of the node being
visited in the Onion Routing topology, o represents the observables in that node
(the nodes before and after it in the path), and h the name of the sender of the
message.
Since the attacker can observe only node 3, all states with l 6= 3 except the
initial state are hidden states. We reduce the chain accordingly; the resulting
observational reduction is shown in Fig. 11a. We call it C. Note that one of the
paths does not pass through node 3, so if that path is chosen the attacker will
never observe anything; in that case the system diverges. We assume that the
attacker can recognize this case, using a timeout or similar means.
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b) c)a)
Figure 11: Markov chains for Onion Routing: a) Observable reduction C b) C/Rh c) C/RA
To compute the leakage we need also to define Rh and RA. This is straight-
forward; Rh is ((s, t) ∈ (S × S)|hs = ht) and RA is ((s, t) ∈ (S × S)|os = ot).
The resulting MCs Ch = C/Rh and CO = C/RA are shown in Fig. 11bc. Note
that CO,h = C/Rh ∩RA = C.
Since the system is very simple, we can extract the leakage equation directly
from Def. 9. The leakage parametrized on I is
H(Ch) +H(CO)−H(CO,h) =
= H(h1, h2, h3, h4) +H(
h1
2 ,
h1
2 + h2, h3,
h4
2 ,
h4
2 )−
H(h12 ,
h1
2 , h2, h3,
h4
2 ,
h4
2 )
(4)
Under constraints 0 ≤ hi ≤ 1 and h1 + h2 + h3 + h4 = 1 it has its maximum of
1.819 bits at h1 = 0.2488, h2 = 0.1244, h3 = 0.2834, h4 = 0.2834, thus these are
the channel capacity and the attacker with highest leakage.
9.2. Case: Channel Capacity of Discrete Time Onion Routing
Due to our intensional view of the system, we can naturally extend our analysis
to integrate timing leaks. Time-based attacks on the Tor implementation of
the Onion Routing network have been proven to be effective, particularly in
low-latency networks [10, 11]. We show how to quantify leaks for an attacker
capable to make some timing observations about the network traffic.
In this example there are two compromised nodes, A and B, and the attacker
is able to count how many time units pass between the message being forwarded
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Figure 12: Network topology
for Timed Onion Routing
h Path o P(O|h)
1(h1) 1→ A→ 3→ 4→ B → R 13, 4R 1/2
1→ A→ 3→ 2→ 4→ B → R 13, 4R 1/2
2(h2) 2→ 4→ B → R NN, 4R 1/2
2→ 1→ A→ 3→ 4→ B → R 13, 4R 1/2
3(h3) 3→ 4→ B → R NN, 4R 1/2
3→ 2→ 4→ B → R NN, 4R 1/2
4(h4) 4→ B → R NN, 4R 1
Figure 13: Timed Onion Routing paths, observations
and probabilities
by A and the message arriving in B. The topology of the network is shown in
Fig. 12 and the relative paths, observations and probabilities in Fig. 13. We will
ignore messages departing from the compromised nodes A and B for simplicity.
We add to the system a low-level variable t that represents the passage
of the time between the message passing by A and passing by B. Variable t
is initialized to 0 when the message passes by A and increased by 1 at each
subsequent step. We will analyze the difference of leakage between the attacker
AT that can discriminate states with different values of t and the attacker
AN that does not have this power. Whenever a packet passes by one of the
compromised nodes A and B the attacker observes what node sent the package
and to what node the package is to be forwarded next, and the value of the
time variable t. Since the attacker can perform two different observations at two
different times (when the packet passes through A and when it passes through
B), the observable reduction in Fig. 14a is not a one-step Markov chain. In
general this could mean that the quotients are not Markov chains. However in
this case it is easy to check that they are.
Both attackers are able to observe nodes A and B, so they have the same
hidden states. Their observable reduction C of the system is the same, depicted
in Fig. 14a. The secret’s discrimination relation is also the same: Rh is ((s, t) ∈
(S × S)|hs = ht), and the resulting quotient Ch = C/Rh is depicted in Fig. 14b.
The two attackers have two different discrimination relations. For the attacker
AN , who is not able to keep count of the discrete passage of time, the relation
is RAN = ((s, t) ∈ (S × S)|os = ot), while for the time-aware attacker AT it is
RAT = ((s, t) ∈ (S × S)|os = ot ∧ ts = tt). The resulting MCs CON = C/RAN
and COT = C/RAT are shown in Fig. 15.
Note that since the time-aware attacker has strictly more discriminating
power, since RAT ⊆ RAN , we expect that he will leak more information. We
show now how to validate this intuition by computing the difference of the
leakage between AT and AN . The difference of the leakage between the two
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b)a)
Figure 14: Markov chains for Timed Onion Routing: a) Observable reduction C b) Ch
b)a)
Figure 15: Markov chains for Timed Onion Routing: a) CON b) COT
attackers is
I(Ch;COT )− I(Ch;CON ) =
H(Ch) +H(COT )−H(C(O,h)T )−H(Ch)−
−H(CON ) +H(C(O,h)N ) =
H(COT )−H(CON ) =
H
(
h1 +
h2
2 ,
h2
2 + h3 + h4
)
+
(
h1 +
h2
2
)
H
(
1
3 ,
2
3
)
−
−H
(
h1 +
h2
2 ,
h2
2 + h3 + h4
)
=(
h1 +
h2
2
)
H
(
1
3 ,
2
3
)
≈
0.91829
(
h1 +
h2
2
)
(5)
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showing that the time-aware attacker AT leaks ≈ 0.91829
(
h1 + h22
)
bits of
information more than the time-unaware attacker AN .
10. The QUAIL Preliminary Implementation
As a proof of concept we present an implementation of part of the technique
presented in Section 3, which we called QUantitative Analyzer for Imperative
Languages (QUAIL). In particular, QUAIL is able to compute the information
leakage of a randomized program written in an imperative language when
observed by an ignorant attacker, i.e. an attacker whose prior distribution IA
over the possible values of the secret is uniform. It models the case in which the
attacker can observe the values of the observable variables after the termination
of the program. If the program does not necessarily terminate, it is assumed that
the non-termination of the program is one of the possible observable outcomes.
QUAIL does not allow the user to define an arbitrary prior distribution
for the attacker, because of the inherent complexity of representing arbitrary
probability distribution over large sample spaces of exponential size in the size of
the variables. For similar reasons, QUAIL does not implement the computation
of channel capacity presented in Section 8.
QUAIL is available at https://project.inria.fr/quail/.
10.1. QUAIL Imperative Language
QUAIL supports a simple but powerful imperative WHILE language. The
language includes constants and array declarations, but not function declarations.
10.1.1. Variable declarations
All variables in QUAIL are fixed sized integers. We force them to be declared
at the beginning of the program to ensure that the analysis terminates and to
simplify scoping.
Variables are declared in one of the four following types: public, private,
secret and observable.
Public and observable variables have an explicit value during the computation.
They represent variables whose value is known at computation time. The only
difference between public and observable variables is that the attacker can
discriminate states that have different values of the latter but not of the former.
Public and observable variables can be manipulated using standard arithmetic
operators.
Public and observable variables are declared as follows:
pub l i c int4 v ;
or
observable int4 v ;
declares a 4 bits integer variable whose name is v, either public or observable.
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pub l i c int4 v := 5 ;
declares v and initializes it to value 5. Any expression can be used to initialize
a variable, provided that the variables used in the expression are public or
constants and have been previously declared. Since QUAIL does not support
function declaration there is a single variable scope. Declaring multiple variables
with the same name is consequently forbidden.
Private and secret variables represent variables that do not have a known
fixed value, but instead a uniform probability distribution over a set of values.
The set of values is represented as a sequence of integer intervals, thus for instance
the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13} would be represented as [0, 3][5, 6][8, 10][13, 13].
The difference between private and secret variables is that the information
leakage is only computed on the latter, while knowing the exact value of the
former is considered to be information that is not interesting to the attacker.
Private and secret variables cannot be used in assignment and expressions.
They can only appear to the left of the operator in a guard. This is to restrict
the leakage analysis to indirect flow of information, but direct flow can still be
modeled if necessary.
Private and secret variables are declared as follows:
pr i va te int4 v ;
or
sec ret int4 v ;
declares a 4 bits integer variable whose name is v, either private or secret.
pr i va te int4 v := [ 0 , 1 ] [ 2 , 5 ] ;
declares var and restricts its range to the two intervals [0,1] and [2,5]. Again
any expression can be used in the bounds of the intervals.
QUAIL allows for the declaration of integer constants. Constants are declared
as follows:
const N := 4 ;
They are replaced by their value during the preprocessing step.
10.1.2. Arrays
Variables can also be arrays of integers and multi-dimensional arrays. Arrays
are declared before the integer type of a variable.
pub l i c array [ 7 ] of int4 tab ;
declares a public variable tab that is an array of 4 bits integer of size 7 whose
indexes range from 0 to 6, while
pub l i c array [ 1 . . 7 ] of int4 tab ;
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declares tab as an array of size 4 whose indexes range from 1 to 7. The size of
an array can be any expression that evaluates to an integer.
An array may be initialized with a set of initial values:
pub l i c array [ 1 . . 4 ] of int4 tab := {1 , 1 , 2 , 2} ;
initializes tab such that tab[1] and tab[2] are equal to 1, while tab[3] and
tab[4] are equal to 2. Private arrays can be initialized like any private variable,
with a set of intervals:
pr i va te array [ 1 . . 4 ] of int4 tab := [ 0 , 1 ] ;
In that case all the variables in the array are initialized to the same range of
integers.
10.1.3. Expressions
Expressions are used in guards, assignments, variables initialization and arrays
indexes. Binary operators (||,&&,^,+,-,*,/ and %) and unary operators (-,!) can
used. Classical operators precedence is assumed. For Boolean operations integer
variables are considered as a true value if non null, and false if null. Only public
and observable variables, constants and integers can be used in expressions.
10.1.4. Guards
Guards are limited to a single comparison between a variable on the left side
(either public, or private, or constant, or an integer value) and an expression on
the right side. Any comparison operator among <,>,<=,>=,== and != can be
used.
10.1.5. Assignments
An assignment statement is written in the following manner:
ass ign v := exp r ;
where v is a public or observable variable (possibly with indexes) and expr is
an expression containing no private or secret variables.
10.1.6. Random assignments
The program can use two types of random primitives to assign values to a
variable.
random v := random ( expr_min , expr_max ) ;
assigns to a public variable v a random value, chosen between the values of
expr_min and expr_max , with a uniform probability distribution.
random v := randombit ( p ) ;
where p is a float value lower than 1, assigns to a public variable v a random bit
value, that is 0 with probability p, and 1 with probability 1− p.
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10.1.7. IF statements
IF conditional statements starts with the keyword if, possibly followed by
elif and else, and ends with fi. The consequent statements are listed after
the keyword then. For example the following structures are allowed:
i f ( h <= l ) then ass ign v :=1;
f i
i f ( h <= l ) then ass ign v :=1;
e l s e ass ign v :=2;
f i
i f ( h <= l ) then ass ign v :=1;
e l i f ( h == l ) then ass ign v :=2;
f i
i f ( h <= l ) then ass ign v :=1;
e l i f ( h == l ) then ass ign v :=2;
e l i f ( h == l +1) then ass ign v :=3;
e l s e ass ign v :=4;
f i
10.1.8. WHILE statements
Conditional WHILE loop starts with the keyword while, followed by a guard,
and the statements included in the loop are listed between the keywords do and
od. For example the following structure is allowed:
whi le ( h <= l ) do
ass ign l := 1 ;
ass ign v := 2 ;
od
10.1.9. FOR statements
A FOR loop can be used to iterate over all the elements of an array. The
syntax is:
f o r ( v i n tab ) do
ass ign v := v+1;
od
The variable v is a local variable that must only be used inside the loop. It
will take successively each value in the array tab. Note that if tab is a multi-
dimensional array v is also an array.
10.1.10. Return statements
The program ends when a return statement is reached. Its syntax is simply:
return ;
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10.2. Attacker Encoding
QUAIL assumes that the attacker is ignorant, i.e. does not have any infor-
mation about the value of the secret except in which range it is, e.g. from 0
to 7 for a 3-bit secret. Like all information-theoretical analysis we assume that
the attacker has access to the source code of the system: assuming otherwise
would invalidate the analysis in case the attacker was able to obtain or infer
information about such code.
The assumption allows QUAIL to build directly the Markov chain model of
the scenario, since whenever a prior distribution on the secret is encountered it
can be assumed to be uniform.
The attacker is assumed to be able to start the program and observe the
values of the output variables after the program’s termination. For this reason,
all and only the internal states of the Markov chain are hidden during the hiding
part of the modeling (see Section 5). If the program does not terminate, we
assume that the attacker is able to recognize this, e.g. via a timeout. In this
case the attacker knows that the program did not terminate but is not able to
read any variable’s value.
For the discrimination relation, as we said the attacker is assumed to be able
to observe only a given subset of the variables, that we call observable variables.
The attacker can thus discriminate two states if and only if they differ in the
value of any of the observable variables, while different states that assign the
same values to the observable variables are impossible to discriminate for him.
To encode an attacker, the QUAIL user only has to specify which variables
are the secret and which variables are observable to the attacker. The rest of
the encoding is automatically handled by the tool.
10.3. Procedure
QUAIL’s analysis proceeds as explained in Section 3, with some improvements
to make the process more streamlined and implementable.
Step 1: Preprocessing. In this step the imperative code gets rewritten in a simpli-
fied if-goto language, following common compiler practice. All if-elif-else-fi
conditional statements and while loop statements are rewritten as follows:
• if-elif-else-fi statement
1 i f CONDITION1 then STATEMENT1;
2 e l i f CONDITION2 then STATEMENT2;
3 e l s e STATEMENT3;
4 f i
becomes
1 i f CONDITION1
2 then goto 4 ;
3 e l s e goto 6 ;
4 STATEMENT1;
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5 goto 12 ;
6 i f CONDITION2
7 then goto 9 ;
8 e l s e goto 11 ;
9 STATEMENT2;
10 goto 12 ;
11 STATEMENT3;
12 . . .
• while statement
1 whi le CONDITION do
2 STATEMENT
3 od
becomes
1 i f CONDITION
2 then goto 4
3 e l s e goto 6
4 STATEMENT
5 goto 1
6 . . .
Also, array calls are substituted with single indexed variables and for state-
ments rewritten to a sequence of commands on such variables. Finally, constants
are substituted with their value. In this step we also add automatically a free
command to signal when a variable is not used anymore and can be collected.
Step 2: Probabilistic Symbolic Execution. QUAIL symbolically executes the
preprocessed code and builds an annotated Markov chain semantics of the
program execution, as explained in Section 3. This step includes building the
MDP model of the system and applying the prior information of the attacker
to it: since we assume that the prior probability distribution over the values of
the secret is uniform, encoding the ignorant attacker, we can build the Markov
chain directly. Whenever a conditional guard is found QUAIL has sufficient
information to compute the probability that the guard will be satisfied, and
constructs two successor states, one if the guard is true and one if it is false,
with appropriate transition probabilities. This is the most time-consuming step
of the computation, since it requires building a full control flow graph of the
system’s behavior and assigning probabilities to it. In the worst case the graph
has exponential size in the size of the variables, but for most academic cases
it has a reasonable size of thousands or tens of thousands of nodes. We apply
on-the-fly reduction techniques like avoiding producing states that we know
will be removed by the next step, but these do not significantly reduce the
computation time of this step.
Step 3: State Hiding and Model Reduction. QUAIL assumes that the attacker
can only observe the values of some variables at the end of the computation,
thus all internal states of the system are to be hidden. We apply Algorithm 1
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iteratively on all internal states until only the initial state and the output states
remain. In this step we also detect nonterminating behavior and, if needed, we
construct an output state modeling non-termination. This operation removes
more than 90% of the states of the Markov chain model, in fact producing a
Markov chain with a single probability distribution from the initial state to the
output states. To make this operation as quick as possible, states are equipped
with a list of their predecessors and successors.
Step 4: Quotienting. In this step we construct three quotients of the Markov
chain, as explained in Section 3. A quotient is obtained by merging together
the states that correspond to the same equivalence class in a given equivalence
relation, as explained in Section 2. The quotients are as follows:
• The attacker’s quotient represents the view that the attacker has of the
system. It is obtained by merging together states that assign the same
values to all and only the observable variables.
• The secret’s quotient represents the system as it depends on the secret.
Its entropy is a measure of how much of the secret is actually used in the
execution of the program. It is obtained by merging together states that
assign the same sets of values to all and only the secret variables.
• The joint quotient represents the joint behavior of the observable variables
and secret variables. It is obtained by merging together states that assign
the same values and sets of values to the observable and secret variables.
To speed up the process, QUAIL drops the information about the variable
assignments in the states of the quotients. Such information is not needed to
perform the rest of the analysis.
Step 5: Entropy and Leakage Computation. Finally, QUAIL computes the
entropy of the three quotients in linear time in the size of the quotients. The
three computations are independent and can be parallelized. The information
leakage is then computed as the sum of the entropies of the attacker’s and
secret’s quotients minus the entropy of the joint quotient, as explained in Section
3. QUAIL outputs the result with the requested amount of significant digits.
If requested, the tool also prints any of the Markovian models it has produced
during the analysis.
10.4. Case Studies
We show how to analyze a number of protocols and academic examples with
QUAIL. For each example we show the commented source code we used to
encode it and comment on the results and variants.
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1 // t h i s b i t i s o b s e r v a b l e
by the u s e r ; i t i s 0
f o r REJECT and 1 f o r
ACCEPT
2 obse r vab l e i n t 1 o ;
3
4 // t h i s r e p r e s e n t s the
password i n s e r t e d by
the u s e r
5 pub l i c i n t 2 i n pu t :=2;
6
7 // t h i s i s the s e c r e t
8 s e c r e t i n t 2 password ;
9
10 //
11 i f ( password==inpu t ) then
12 a s s i g n o :=1;
13 e l s e
14 a s s i g n o :=0;
15 f i
16
17 // t e rm i n a t e
18 r e t u r n ;
Password length Leakage
1 1
2 8.11 · 10−1
32 7.78 · 10−9
64 3.54 · 10−18
512 3.81 · 10−152
Figure 16: Simple authentication example: model (on the left) and resulting leakage according
to password length (on the right).
10.4.1. Simple Authentication
In this basic example the attacker is trying to infer the password of a system
by trying to provide as a password a given number in the password domain. The
model is shown in Fig. 16 on the left.
The length of the secret is the size of the variable password on line 8. Since
the variable is not explicitly initialized, QUAIL assumes that it is in the interval
[0, 2size − 1]. On line 5 the variable input, representing what is input by the
attacker, is initialized with an arbitrary value. The value chosen is irrelevant as
long as it is in the range of the possible values for the password.
Increasing the size of the password changes the amount of leakage, since the
attacker learns less information about the password from a single attack attempt.
The information leakage values for some password sizes are shown in Fig. 16 on
the right. Since this quantifies Shannon leakage, the leakage value is inversely
proportional to the time it takes to learn the secret by brute force. The results
prove that it is harder for an attacker to brute force a password with a larger
password space, in accordance with intuition.
It is worth noting that QUAIL solves this example with any password size in
milliseconds because it uses the Markovian process encoding that we presented
in this work. In particular, the size of the Markov chain in this case does not
depend on the size of the secret. Any analysis based on channel matrices would
have to build the channel matrix for this examples. Such matrix has a number
of rows exponential in the size of the secret. This operation alone would require
from days to millennia, according to the chosen size of the password. While the
Markovian model we presented in general has an exponential number of states
in the size of the secret and of the observable, this example shows how in many
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1 obse r vab l e i n t 1 o ; // t h i s
b i t r e p r e s e n t s the
output
2
3 pub l i c i n t 1 r ; // t h i s b i t
i s randomly gene r a t ed
4
5 // t h i s b i t i s the s e c r e t
6 s e c r e t i n t 1 s ;
7
8 // randomize the random b i t
w i th a g i v en
p r o b a b i l i t y
9 random r := randombit ( 0 . 5 ) ;
10
11 // c a l c u l a t e the XOR
12 i f ( s==r ) then
13 a s s i g n o :=0;
14 e l s e
15 a s s i g n o :=1;
16 f i
17
18 // t e rm i n a t e
19 r e t u r n ;
Figure 17: Bit XOR example: model (on the left) and graph of the information leakage over
the probability of the random bit on line 9 (on the right).
useful cases the model is significantly smaller than the worst case. Again this is
an improvement compared to channel matrices, whose size is always exponential
in the size of the secret and observables, and not only in the worst case.
We finally remark that the results are presented with 2 decimal digits, but
QUAIL can work with any precision, as requested by the user.
10.4.2. Bit XOR
This is one of the simplest examples of randomized programs depending on a
secret. In this case the secret is a bit. The system produces a random bit with
a probability distribution known to the attacker, computes the exclusive OR
of the secret and the random bit, and outputs the result to the attacker. The
question is how much of the secret bit can the attacker infer by knowing the
result of the exclusive OR. The model is shown in Fig. 17 on the left.
On line 9 we assign to the random bit r the value 0 with the given probability
and 1 otherwise. We remind that the attacker possesses the source code, so he
knows the probability distribution over r, but not the value that gets assigned
to r during a given execution.
Note that we cannot directly calculate the result of the exclusive or by writing
assign o := s XOR r because QUAIL does not allow private or secret variables
to appear in an assignment statement. This is a limit of the representation of
the variables in the tool, not in the theory. Work is under way to allow for a
more natural encoding of this kind of operations.
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1 // a v a r i a b l e to
l oop on
2 obse r vab l e i n t 2
o :=0;
3
4 // t h i s i s the
s e c r e t ,
e i t h e r 0 , 1 ,
2 or 3
5 s e c r e t i n t 2 s
:= [ 0 , 3 ] ;
6
7 // i f the s e c r e t
i s 0 then
loop f o r e v e r
8 i f ( s==0) then
9 wh i l e ( o==0)
do
10 s k i p ;
11 od
12 f i
13
14 // i f the s e c r e t
i s 3 a l s o
l oop f o r e v e r
15 i f ( s==3) then
16 wh i l e ( o==0)
do
17 s k i p ;
18 od
19 f i
20
21 // t e rm i n a t e
22 r e t u r n ;
Figure 18: Conditional non-termination example: model (on the left) and snippet of the
Markov chain model (on the right).
10.4.3. Conditional Non-Termination
This example shown QUAIL’s treatment of non-terminating programs. We
have a 2-bit secret variable s, i.e. s is either 0, 1, 2 or 3. There is also an
observable variable o that is initialized to 0 and never changes its value. Then
the program terminates if s is 1 or 2, and loops forever otherwise. The model
for the example is shown in Fig. 18 on the left.
In this example QUAIL reports a leakage of 1 bit. The reason is that the
attacker, being able to distinguish whether the program terminates or not via a
timeout, can infer whether the secret is 1 or 2 or whether is 0 or 3. In both cases
its ignorance goes down from 4 possible cases to 2 possible cases, thus being
quantified in 1 bit of gained information.
In Fig. 18 on the right we can see the last part of the Markov chain produced
by QUAIL, in particular showing how QUAIL detects non-terminating loops.
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11. Related work
Alvim, Andrés and Palamidessi [28] study leakage and channel capacity
of interactive systems where secrets and observables can alternate during the
computation.
Chen and Malacaria study leakage and channel capacity of traces and sub-
traces of programs [29], and, in [30], consider transition systems with particular
attention to multi-threaded programs. They use Bellman equations to determine
the minimal and maximal leakage. None of these works however deal explicitly
with Markov Chains and randomized systems.
Intensional aspects of systems like timing leaks have been investigated by
Köpf et al. in [7, 6, 31] and more recent work by Köpf, Mauborgne and Ochoa
has investigated caching leaks [32].
Channel capacity for the Onion Routing protocol has been first characterized
by Chen and Malacaria using Lagrange multipliers [5].
The Lattice of Information approach to security seems to be related to the
Abstract Interpretation approach to code obfuscation investigated by Giacobazzi
et al. [33]; it would be interesting to further understand the connection between
these approaches.
12. Conclusion
We presented a method to quantify the information leakage of a probabilistic
system to an attacker. The method considers the probabilistic partial informa-
tion semantics of the system and allows to encode attackers that can partially
observe the internal behavior of the system. The method presented can be fully
automated, and an implementation is being developed. The paper extends the
consolidated LoI approach for leakage computation to programs with randomized
behavior.
We extended the method to compute the channel capacity of a program,
thus giving a security guarantee that does not depend on a given attacker,
but considers the worst case scenario. We show how this can be obtained by
maximizing an equation parametrized on the prior information of the attacker.
The automatization of this computation raises interesting theoretical problems,
as it requires to encode the property that all probability distributions on state
must be derived from the same prior information, and thus involves a global
constraint. We intend to work further on identifying suitable optimizations for
constraints arising in this problem.
Finally, we analyzed the channel capacity of the Onion Routing protocol,
encoding the classical attacker able to observe the traffic in a node and also a new
attacker with time-tracking capabilities, and we proved that the time-tracking
attacker is able to infer more information about the secret of the system.
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